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Abstract
Recent theoretical work shows that changes in the volatility of in°ation and/or unem-
ployment a®ect equilibrium in°ation outcomes when the central banker's loss function
is asymmetric. We show that previous evidence o®ered in support of the proposition
that the volatility of unemployment helps explain in°ation outcomes su®ers from a spu-
rious regression problem. Once this problem is controlled for, the evidence suggests
that the volatility of unemployment does not help explain in°ation outcomes. There
is some evidence of a relationship between in°ation and its volatility, but the data is
not strongly supportive of the view that asymmetric central bank preferences are an
important driver of in°ation.
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The view that central bank preferences are asymmetric in deviations of in°ation and/or
unemployment from their target levels has received increasing attention from macroe-
conomists, in part due to its resonance with the comments of policy insiders (examples
include Blinder (1997, 1998) and Goodhart (1998)). Empirical work investigating such
asymmetries and the resulting non-linearities in monetary policy reaction functions ¯nds
evidence of asymmetries in central bank preferences.1 Recent theoretical work (Cukier-
man (1999), Ruge-Murcia(2002, 2003a), Gerlach (2003), and Nobay & Peel (2003)) shows
that when central banker's preferences are asymmetric, the variances of in°ation and/or
unemployment a®ect equilibrium in°ation. These results suggest that the interaction of
asymmetric central bank preferences and the volatilities of in°ation and unemployment
may be an important determinant of in°ation.
In this paper we ask to what extent this mechanism can explain observed in°ation trends
within countries over time as well as observed cross country di®erences in average in°ation
rates. Our results consistently suggest that volatility in unemployment does not help explain
either within or across country in°ation outcomes. The evidence concerning whether or not
in°ation volatility can help explain in°ation outcomes, is less conclusive. The time series
evidence suggests that high in°ation volatility is associated with a lower in°ation rate, at
least in some OECD countries, though our results imply that this mechanism does not
explain much of the time series variation of in°ation.
In the cross country data, we do ¯nd evidence of a strong, positive correlation between
the level in°ation and its variance. While this suggests a relationship between in°ation and
the volatility it does not constitute strong evidence in favor of the mechanism of asymmetric
central bank preferences, as the sign of the correlation implies that central bankers dislike
1Reduced form tests for asymmetries in policy reaction functions include Bec, Ben Salem, & Collard
(2002), Kim, Osborn, & Sensier (2002), Cukierman & Muscatelli (2002), Martin & Milas (2004), Karagedikli
& Lees (2004), and Bruinshoofd & Candelon (2005). Tests based on more structural models include Surico
(2004, 2003), Dolado, Maria-Dolores, & Naviera (2005), Dolada, Maria-Dolores, & Ruge-Murcia (2004), and
Aguiar & Martins (2005). While the literature has yet to arrive at a consensus view, most investigations
¯nd support for some form of asymmetry.
1low in°ation more than they dislike high in°ation.
In the classic Kydland-Prescott, Barro-Gordon (KPBG) monetary policy framework
(Kydland & Prescott (1977), Barro & Gordon (1983)), if central bankers attempt to target
an unemployment rate below the NAIRU, policy su®ers from a time inconsistency problem,
and that monetary policy exhibits an in°ation bias. The standard formulation models cen-
tral bankers' preferences as a symmetric, usually quadratic, loss function in the deviations
of in°ation and unemployment from their respective targets. Extending this framework to
incorporate an asymmetric loss function allows for the possibility that central bankers may
dislike deviations from target of one sign more than those of the other sign. For example,
a central banker may strongly dislike shocks that drive unemployment above the NAIRU,
but be more willing to tolerate shocks that drive unemployment below the NAIRU.
In an economy where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric, in°ation depends
on the variances of in°ation and unemployment. Consider an economy in which the vari-
ance of shocks to unemployment increases. With a higher variance, the probability of an
episode of very high (and strongly disliked) unemployment increases. The central banker
will respond with expansionary monetary policy, in an attempt to drive the average un-
employment rate down, to reduce the likelihood of an episode of very high unemployment.
This policy (were it to succeed) would make an episode of very low unemployment more
likely. Given the asymmetry in the loss function, the policy maker would be willing to pay
this price to avoid a more distasteful episode of very high unemployment.
In equilibrium, however, private agents anticipate the central banker's expansionary
policy with the result that the e®ect of this policy is to drive up the in°ation rate. This
outcome closely resembles the time inconsistency result of the original KPBG model. The
main di®erence here being that, rather than targeting an unattainably low unemployment
rate, the source of the in°ationary bias is the central banker's wish to drive down the
unemployment rate to reduce the probability of a very high unemployment episode.
In this paper we investigate the value of this mechanism in explaining in°ation outcomes
observed in both time series, and cross sectional data. We begin by asking whether changes
2in the volatility of in°ation and unemployment over time within a country are related to
times series trends in in°ation that we observe within that country. Recent evidence (for
example, Ruge-Murcia (2004)) o®ers some support for the proposition that asymmetric
preferences with regards to unemployment can explain in°ation trends in at least some of
the G-7 countries.
We employ Monte Carlo methods to show that, when in°ation is persistent (which is the
case in most, if not all, OECD countries) simple regressions of in°ation on the conditional
volatility of unemployment over-reject a correct null hypothesis of no relationship if the con-
ditional volatility of unemployment exhibits persistence. Existing empirical work, which is
con¯rmed by our own investigation, ¯nds that changes in the conditional volatility of unem-
ployment have statistically signi¯cant e®ects on changes in in°ation only in those countries
for which the conditional variance of unemployment is most persistent. We conclude that
these e®ects are likely spurious.
In an attempt to eliminate the spurious regression problem, we re-do the analysis by tak-
ing ¯rst di®erences of in°ation and the conditional variance of unemployment. The results
suggest that changes in the conditional variance of unemployment are not correlated with
changes in in°ation, implying that the combination of asymmetric central bank preferences
and changes in the volatility of unemployment is not a promising explanation of time series
in°ation trends in OECD countries.
We then examine the relationship between the conditional variance of in°ation and
in°ation in time series data for OECD countries, again using ¯rst di®erences of in°ation
and its conditional volatility to reduce the likelihood of spurious results.2 The results here
are more mixed than the unemployment results. There is statistically signi¯cant evidence of
an inverse relationship between in°ation and its conditional volatility, as would be implied
if asymmetric central bank preferences were important, in about one third of the countries.3
2Our econometric work follows the model by assuming that the conditional volatility is predetermined
relative to the level of the in°ation rate, though the direction of causality could go in the opposite direction
(see, for example, Friedman (1977)).
3For completeness, we estimated this relationship in levels, rather than ¯rst di®erences. In this case, the
results suggest a strong, positive relationship between changes in the conditional variance of in°ation and
3On the other hand, the data rejects such a relationship in about half of the countries in the
sample, with the results for the remaining countries being more inconclusive. Furthermore,
even in those countries for which there is evidence of a relationship between in°ation and its
conditional volatility, the model generally explains very little of the variation of changes of
in°ation. These results suggest that while changes in the volatility of in°ation, interacting
with asymmetric central bank preferences, may a®ect in°ation to a degree in a subset of
countries, there is no strong support for the view that this mechanism is an important
determinant of in°ation trends.
Finally we ask whether cross country di®erences in the volatility of in°ation and unem-
ployment can explain observed cross country di®erences in average in°ation rates in samples
including both developed and developing countries. In previous work, Ruge-Murcia (2002),
and Cukierman & Gerlach (2003) test versions of the asymmetric preference model on cross
sectional data for samples of OECD countries. Relative to these papers, our contribution
is to increase the sample of countries examined, as well as to control for additional factors
that have been identi¯ed as important in°uences on in°ation in the empirical literature on
cross country in°ation di®erences.
As in the time series case, the volatility of unemployment does not contribute much in
explaining cross country di®erences in in°ation in any of our regressions. This conclusion
is robust to a variety of permutations of the basic regression model designed to control for
problems that arise due to the nature of the pooled cross country data.
The volatility of in°ation, in the cross sectional data, is consistently positively correlated
with average in°ation rates. It is not clear that this is due to the mechanism of asymmetric
central bank preferences. In order to generate a positive correlation between in°ation and
the volatility of in°ation, the central banker would have to dislike negative deviations from
the in°ation target more than he or she dislikes positive deviations. In other words, the
changing in°ation outcomes. From the view of a model based on asymmetric central bank preferences, the
main problem with this result is that, in order to generate a positive correlation between in°ation and the
volatility of in°ation, the central banker would have to dislike negative deviations from the in°ation target
more than he or she dislikes positive deviations.
4model would explain a positive correlation between in°ation and its conditional variance
as resulting from policy makers in countries with volatile shocks to in°ation deliberately
engineering high average in°ation rates in order to avoid low in°ation outcomes. While
this is possible, it seems intuitively to be the less likely case, and is inconsistent with more
direct estimates of asymmetries in central bank preferences.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the model, Sections 3 and 4 provide
empirical results from time series and cross-sectional tests of the model, respectively. Section
5 concludes.
2 Model Overview
In this section we present a model in which monetary policy is time inconsistent due
to asymmetries in the central banker's loss function in departures of both in°ation and
unemployment from their respective target levels. Since the material in this section is drawn
directly from the work of others, we restrict ourselves to outlining the model, and presenting
the equilibrium outcome, along with the accompanying intuition. Readers desiring a more
detailed exposition are referred to Ruge-Murcia (2002), from which this version of the model
is taken. Cukierman (1999), Gerlach (2003), Nobay and Peel (2003), and Ruge-Murcia
(2003a; 2003b; 2004) o®er variants of the model.
2.1 The Basic Framework
The model begins with an expectations augmented short run Phillips curve, which ties
deviations of unemployment from the NAIRU to unexpected in°ation and exogenous shocks:
ut = un + ¸(¼t ¡ ¼e
t) + ´t (2.1)
where ¼t is the rate of in°ation in period t, ¼e
t represents households' expectations of period
t in°ation, ut is the rate of unemployment, un is the NAIRU, and ´t is an unemployment
shock, where ´ » N(0;¾2
´). In some applications (for example, Ireland (1999)), the NAIRU
is allowed to vary over time. Here, to simplify the exposition, we use the simplest assump-
5tion, which is that the NAIRU is constant.
The central banker does not control in°ation directly, but rather chooses the level of
some policy instrument, it, which a®ects in°ation, subject to some control error µt:
¼t = f(it) + µt (2.2)
where f(¢) is a monotonic, continuous, di®erentiable function and µ » N(0;¾2
µ). This shock
is commonly thought of as a control error, and serves to both introduce exogenous volatility
into the in°ation process, and break the equality between equilibrium unemployment and
the NAIRU. In the absence of µt (i.e. if the central banker could control in°ation perfectly),
rational expectations implies that the private sectors forecasts of in°ation would always
be correct, implying that unemployment always equaled the NAIRU, which does not seem
reasonable.
Private agents have rational expectations, so that
¼e
t = Ef¼tjItg; (2.3)
where It is the information set of the private sector, which contains all information except
the current realizations of the shocks.
The problem facing the central banker in each period is to choose it so as to minimize:
EfL(¼t ¡ ¼¤;ut ¡ u¤)j­tg; (2.4)
where L(¼t;ut) is the central banker's loss function, which generally depends on the devia-
tions of in°ation and unemployment from their targets, denoted by ¼¤, and u¤, respectively,
and ­t is the central banker's information set, which includes all information except the
current realizations of the shocks and equation (2.3) (as private sector expectations are
taken as given by the central bank). The central banker's optimization is subject to the
constraints given by (2.1) and (2.2).
Since the central banker takes expectations as given, he or she is unable to commit to
a monetary policy rule. Instead, in each period, after the private agents have formed their
6expectations but before the realization of the shocks ´t and µt, the central banker chooses
the value of the policy instrument, it.
In the Kydland-Prescott Barro-Gordon version of this model, the central banker's loss
function is quadratic in the deviation of unemployment from target, and in the deviation
of in°ation from target:
L(¼t ¡ ¼¤;ut ¡ u¤) = (1=2)(¼t ¡ ¼¤)2 + (1=2)(ut ¡ u¤)2 (2.5)
The unemployment target is k¢un, where 0 < k · 1. Time inconsistency of policy results in
the case where k < 1, as the central banker attempts to use expansionary monetary policy
to drive unemployment below the NAIRU. The private sector understands this policy, and
adjusts its expectations of in°ation accordingly. The result is sub-optimally high in°ation,
with no corresponding decline in unemployment.
2.2 Asymmetric Preferences
Recent work extends this basic framework by replacing the quadratic loss function with
an asymmetric function. The Linex speci¯cation for preferences is popular (Ruge-Murcia
(2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004), and Nobay & Peel(2003)) as it is tractable and nests the KPBG
outcome as a special case:
L(¼t;ut) = (e®(¼t¡¼¤) ¡ ®(¼t ¡ ¼¤) ¡ 1)=(®2) + ©(e°(ut¡u¤) ¡ °(ut ¡ u¤) ¡ 1)=(°2): (2.6)
While the central bank's unemployment target, u¤, could be anything in principle, it is
usually assumed to be related to the NAIRU. Here we make the typical assumption that
u¤ is some fraction of the NAIRU: u¤ = k ¢ un, where k · 1. The in°ation target ¼¤ is
generally exogenous, and is sometimes assumed to be zero.
In general, when the loss function is asymmetric, the deviation of in°ation from target
(E(¼jI) ¡ ¼¤) will be a function of the unemployment target, the conditional variance of
in°ation, and the conditional variance of unemployment. The equilibrium in°ation rate in
this economy is:
E(¼jI) = ¼¤ ¡ (®¾2
¼=2) + (1=®)ln[1 + (®¸©=°)(e°(1¡k)un(°2¾2
u)=21)] (2.7)
7where ¾¼ is the conditional variance of in°ation and ¾2
u is the conditional variance of unem-







Asymmetries in the loss function mean that central bankers dislike deviations from target
with one sign more than deviations from target with the other sign. If central bankers
dislike high unemployment more than they dislike low unemployment (i.e. ° > 0), the
central banker would be willing to accept an unemployment rate that is below the target
level on average, in return for a lower chance of su®ering through a period of very high
unemployment. In this case, periods of highly volatile unemployment will cause the central
banker to pursue in°ationary policy in an attempt to drive down the average unemployment
rate, so as to insure against high unemployment shocks. Of course, the form of the Phillips
curve (2.1) along with the rational expectations assumption (2.3) implies that the central
bank's attempts to systematically engineer lower unemployment results, in equilibrium, only
in higher in°ation.
Similarly, if central bankers' preferences are asymmetric in the in°ation rate (or the
deviation of the in°ation rate from some target), an increase in the volatility of in°ation
a®ects the conduct of monetary policy and, consequently, the average in°ation rate. To
the extent that central bankers dislike high in°ation more than they dislike low in°ation
(i.e. ® > 0), an increase in the volatility of in°ation is likely to lead to lower average
in°ation. Higher volatility of in°ation causes central bankers to reduce average in°ation so
as to insure against high in°ation shocks.
The above intuition assumes ® > 0, ° > 0. If ® < 0, the central banker dislikes low
in°ation more than high in°ation, implying that the central banker raises average in°ation
when the volatility of in°ation is high to insure against low in°ation shocks. Similarly,
if ° < 0, the central banker lowers in°ation when unemployment is more volatile, in an
attempt to insure against low unemployment shocks. While ® < 0, and/or ° < 0 are
theoretically possible, ® > 0, ° > 0 is the most intuitively plausible case.
82.3 Empirical Implications
The model takes the NAIRU, and the conditional volatility of both in°ation and unemploy-
ment as exogenous. If we take the model seriously, it is reasonable to use single equation
methods to estimate model parameters. Since the equilibrium condition for in°ation in-
volves taking the log of an exponential function, an estimation framework that employs a
linear approximation of this ¯rst order condition is a reasonable approximation. Thus, the





¼;j;t + ²j;t (2.8)
where, j is the country, t is the time period, ²j;t is an error term, and:
b1 = ¸©(1 ¡ k)
b2 = (°¸©=2)
b3 = ¡(®=2):
While individual model parameters cannot be identi¯ed in this framework, it is possible
to relate the signs of various coe±cient estimates back to underlying parameters. Of main
interest are the parameters related to the asymmetries in the loss function.
First note that, since ¸ and © are positive by assumption, a positive estimate of b2
implies that ° is positive. This corresponds to the intuitively reasonable case in which
the central banker dislikes high unemployment more than low unemployment. Similarly,
a negative value of b3 implies that ® must be positive, which corresponds to the other
intuitively attractive case, in which the central banker dislikes high in°ation more than low
in°ation. Finally, it is possible to relate b1 back to the KPBG in°ation bias, as a positive
value of b1 corresponds to a case where there is an in°ation bias, whilst a zero value of b1
would correspond to the case where the central banker targets the NAIRU.
The model nests a number of special cases: As the central bank targets the NAIRU,
k ! 1, so the KPBG in°ation bias vanishes, and b1 equals 0. If central bank preferences
are symmetric in unemployment, then ° ! 0, and b2 equals zero. Similarly, if central bank
9preferences are symmetric in in°ation, ® ! 0, corresponding to the case where b3 equals
zero.
3 Evidence from Time Series Data
In this section we examine whether the asymmetric loss function model of the previous
section helps explain time series in°ation outcomes in OECD countries. We focus on the role
of the conditional variances of in°ation and unemployment in explaining in°ation trends,
and downplay the role of the KPBG in°ation bias.4
In section 3.1 we re-examine the existing empirical literature on the role of asymmetric
preferences in unemployment in understanding time series trends in in°ation. We argue
that ¯ndings of a statistically signi¯cant relationship between in°ation and the conditional
variance of unemployment are likely contaminated by a spurious regression problem. In
section 3.2 we attempt to correct for this problem by re-estimating the model in ¯rst dif-
ferences. We also examine the case where central bank's preferences are asymmetric in
in°ation.
3.1 Revisiting Existing Results
Ruge-Murcia (2004) formulates a model of in°ation rate determination when the cen-
tral banker targets the natural rate of unemployment but has asymmetric preferences in
unemployment.5 The model's reduced form solution for the in°ation rate time series is the
linear regression equation:
¼t = a + b ¢ ¾2
u;t + ²t (3.9)
where ¼t is the in°ation rate in period t, ¾2
u;t is the conditional variance of the unemployment
rate in period t, and ²t is a white noise error term. Asymmetric preferences imply that the
4If the NAIRU is time varying, the equilibrium in°ation rate will mimic any trends in the NAIRU, as
the in°ation bias is higher for higher NAIRUs. Ireland (1999) shows that this mechanism may help explain
long term trends in U.S. in°ation rates. Doyle & Falk (2004) argue that this conclusion does not extend to
other OECD countries.
5This corresponds to a special case of the model in Section 2, where there is no Kydland-Prescott Barro-
Gordon bias (i.e. k = 1) and the central bank's loss function is asymmetric in unemployment (° 6= 0), but
not in°ation (® ! 0).
10parameter b will be nonzero, being positive (negative) if the central bank prefers deviations
below (above) the natural rate.
Ruge-Murcia (2004) ¯ts model (3.9) to quarterly time series data for Canada (1961:1-
1999:2), France (1970:1-1999:2), Italy (1970:1-1999:2), the United Kingdom (1960:1-1999:2)
and the United States (1960:1-1992). The in°ation rate is measured as the (annualized)
percentage change in the GDP de°ator. The unemployment rate is the quarterly average
civilian unemployment rate. The conditional variance of the unemployment rate is estimated
from a GARCH(1,1) formulation of the ¯rst-di®erence of the unemployment rate.6; 7
The point estimates of b are all positive, which is consistent with asymmetric preferences
favoring unemployment rates below the natural rate. However, the estimated b's are not
statistically signi¯cant for Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom. They are signi¯cant
only for France and the United States. Ruge-Murcia (2004, p.105) concludes that \estimates
of the reduced-form parameters support this hypothesis for the United States and France,
but not for Canada, Italy, or the United Kingdom." Ruge-Murcia (2004, p.103) also notes
that \the countries for which b is statistically di®erent from zero are also the countries for
which the conditional variance of unemployment is unemployment is the most persistent."
Thus, Ruge-Murcia's (2004) time series regressions of the in°ation rate on the (esti-
mated) conditional variance of the unemployment rate provide evidence of a statistically
signi¯cant relationship only for those countries with highly persistent conditional variances.8
This is not a prediction of the theory. Perhaps it is a coincidental result. Or, it could re°ect
a spurious regression problem resulting from the persistence of both the dependent and
independent variables in the regression. We pursue this possibility below.9
6Japan was initially included in the sample but was excluded because its unemployment rate did not
display evidence of conditional heteroskedasticity.
7Ruge-Murcia actually estimated the model of the unemployment rate and its conditional variance jointly
with model (3.9) using quasi-maximum likelihood. He notes, and our results con¯rm, that the results for
model (3.9) obtained by a two-step procedure in which OLS is applied to (3.9) after the conditional variances
are estimated in the ¯rst step provide essentially the same results.
8This result is not speci¯c to the countries studied by Ruge-Murcia. We have con¯rmed that it holds in
the larger set of countries we examine in the section 3.2.
9It is worth noting that Ruge-Murcia's test also relies on the assumption that the in°ation rate is condi-
tionally homoskedastic, an assumption that our subsequent tests suggest is invalid for most countries in his
sample.




ht = ¹ + ®w2
t¡1 + !ht¡1
where wt is the innovation in the unemployment rate and vt is an i.i.d. sequence of zero-
mean and unit-variance random variables. It can be shown (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1994) that
this GARCH(1,1) implies that w2
t has an ARMA(1,1) representation whose autoregressive
coe±cient is ® + !. Therefore, ® + ! measures the persistence of the conditional variance.
In the limit, ®+! = 1 which de¯nes the IGARCH(1,1) model. The values of ®+! reported
by Ruge-Murcia (2004) for the United States and France are 0.87 and 0.92, respectively.
The values of ® + ! for Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom are 0.49, 0.70, and 0.36,
respectively.
Not only are the conditional variances of the unemployment rates for the United States
and France persistent, but so are their in°ation rates, with ¯rst-order autocorrelation co-
e±cients equal to 0.87 and 0.80. In fact, the same unit root tests that leads Ruge-Murcia
(2004) to conclude that unemployment rates are I(1) processes, lead to the same conclusion
for in°ation rates in these countries. (See, for example, Ireland (1999), or Doyle & Falk
(2004).)
We constructed the following Monte Carlo experiment. First, the time series yt;t =
1;:::;T, was constructed according to the AR(1) model:
yt = ½yt¡1 + ut; ut i:i:d:N(0;1); 0 < ½ · 1: (3.11)
Second, the time series ht;t = 1;:::;T was independently constructed as the conditional




ht = ¹ + ®w2
t¡1 + !ht¡1 (3.12)
vt » i:i:d: N(0;1)
¹ = 1; 0 · ® · 1; 0 · ! < 1; ® + ! · 1
12The regression of yt on a constant and ht was run and a t-test was applied to the
(true) null hypothesis that the regression coe±cient on ht equals zero, using a nominal test
size of ¯ve-percent. The actual rejection rates, compiled for 1000 simulations and sample
sizes 100, 500, and 2000, are reported in Table 1. It is clear from Table 1 that regressions
of persistent time series on persistent conditional variance series su®er from the spurious
regression problem, with actual rejection rates much greater than nominal rejection rates
for both small and large sample sizes. Ruge-Murcia's point estimates of ® and ! for France
are 0.12 and 0.80, respectively, based on a sample size of approximately 120 observations.
Assuming that the largest autoregressive root in the in°ation rate series is at least 0.80, our
results suggest that if in equation (3.9) the coe±cient b is equal to zero, the null hypothesis
that it is zero would be incorrectly rejected at the ¯ve-percent level over 40-percent of the
time!
Our conclusion is that existing ¯ndings of a statistically signi¯cant correlation between
the conditional variance of unemployment and in°ation may well be spurious. The next
section of the paper represents our attempts at correcting for this problem.
3.2 Correcting for Persistence
Regressions of the in°ation rate on its own conditional variance, or on the conditional
variance of the unemployment rate, are problematic in those cases where the conditional
variance is an exact or approximate IGARCH process. Neither the asymptotic nor ¯nite
sample properties of regressions with IGARCH regressors, including IGARCH-M regres-
sions, have been developed, other than the simulation results we presented earlier which
showed that such regressions appear to be contaminated by the spurious regression problem.
The problem may be further complicated by the fact that the dependent variable, i.e. the
in°ation rate, appears to be an exact or approximate unit root process.
Given the highly persistent behavior of the in°ation rate and, in some cases, the con-
ditional variance of the unemployment rate, it seems reasonable to consider estimating the
model in ¯rst di®erences. To this end, we collected an alternative data set made up of
13quarterly unemployment and CPI-based in°ation rates for eighteen countries: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
We used the largest sample available in each country, which for most countries spans from
the mid to late 1960s until 2003.10
We began by estimating the model of the previous section, this time in di®erences.
Taking ¯rst di®erences of 3.9 gives
¢¼t = b¢¾2
u;t + ²t; (3.13)
where ¢xt = xt ¡ xt¡1, and ¾2
u;t is the conditional variance of the unemployment rate.11
Assuming that the in°ation target is constant, the model suggests that the di®erenced form
of the regression should be ¯t without an intercept. We ran the di®erenced regression
with and without an intercept. The results with respect to the parameter b were virtually
identical and the intercept was not statistically signi¯cant in any case. Therefore, we only
report the results for the regressions run without an intercept.
Following Ruge-Murcia, we ¯rst tested for a unit root in the unemployment rate and
found that the unit root null could not be rejected for any of these countries. Since the
parameter b in equation (1) is not identi¯ed in the absence of time-varying conditional
heteroskedasticity, we next tested for ARCH e®ects in the ¯rst di®erence of the unemploy-
ment rate. Each di®erenced unemployment series was ¯t to an AR(p) model, where p was
selected by the AIC, and the squared residual series was ¯t to AR(1), AR(2), AR(3), and
AR(4) models. We applied Engle's (1982) LM test and if any of the p-values was less than
or equal to 10-percent, we took this as evidence of possible conditional heteroskedasticity.
If the di®erenced unemployment series displayed such evidence of conditional heteroskedas-
ticity, we ¯t the ¯rst di®erence of the rate of in°ation to the ¯rst di®erence of the estimated
10The data appendix to the paper describes the data in more detail.
11We also estimated the model using the conditional variance of the unemployment gap, recovered from
a cubic de-trending of the unemployment rate. This allows for the possibility that monetary policy makers
interpret low frequency changes in the unemployment rate as changes in the NAIRU, and target monetary
policy towards the deviations of the actual unemployment rate from the NAIRU. The use of the conditional
variance of the output gap did not change the results substantively.
14GARCH(1,1) conditional variance series for the di®erenced unemployment rate's innova-
tions.
The results using the CPI as the price series are presented in Table 2.12 We ¯nd evidence
of time varying conditional heteroskedasticity in 9 out of the 18 countries. In two of these
countries, the ARCH e®ects were not persistent, and in both of these cases the estimate
of b was positive, though statistically signi¯cant only in one (Austria) and at the 10%
level. In the remaining 7 countries, we detected persistent ARCH e®ects. In four of these
countries, the point estimate of b was negative, but statistically signi¯cant in only two of
these four countries. In the remaining three countries, the estimate of b was positive, but
not statistically signi¯cant.
These results suggest that the mechanism posited by the model does not ¯t very well as
an explanation of time series patterns in in°ation in our sample of countries. There is no
evidence of time variation in the conditional volatility in about half of the countries in the
sample, and in about half of the countries for which ARCH e®ects are present the estimate
of the key parameter, b, is of the intuitively unattractive sign. In none of the 18 countries
do we ¯nd statistically signi¯cant evidence that the conditional variance of unemployment
is positively related to the change in in°ation, as the model would suggest.
Given the lack of support for the view that changes in the conditional variance of un-
employment cause changes in in°ation, we turn our attention to the case where preferences
are asymmetric in in°ation, but not unemployment.13 The model's reduced form solution
in this case results in a linear equation relating ¼ to the conditional variance of ¼:
¼t = a + b ¢ ¾2
¼;t + ²t (3.14)
We estimate the model in ¯rst di®erences, as both the in°ation rate and the conditional
12Unreported estimates using the GDP de°ator as the price series for a smaller sample of countries mirror
the results reported in Table 2.
13This corresponds to the special case of the model in Section 2, where there is no Kydland-Prescott
Barro-Gordon bias (i.e. k = 1) and the central bank's loss function is asymmetric in in°ation (® 6= 0), but
not unemployment (° ! 0).
15variance of the in°ation rate exhibit high persistence. Taking ¯rst di®erences of 3.14 gives:
¢¼t = b¢¾2
¼;t + ²t; (3.15)
which forms the basis of our estimation. As before, the results with respect to the parameter
b in regressions with and without an intercept were virtually identical and the intercept was
not statistically signi¯cant in any case.
As in the previous case, the slope coe±cient in 3.15 is only identi¯ed if the conditional
variance is time-varying, so we began by testing for ARCH e®ects in the ¯rst di®erence of
the in°ation rate using the procedure outlined above for the unemployment rate. If the
in°ation series displayed evidence of conditional heteroskedasticity, we ¯t the series to a
GARCH-M regression with a GARCH(1,1) error speci¯cation, using the quasi-maximum
likelihood estimator to get an estimate of the conditional variance of the in°ation rate. We
then estimate the slope coe±cient, b, by ¯tting the ¯rst di®erence of in°ation to the ¯rst
di®erence of the estimated conditional variance series.14
Results using the CPI as the prices series are presented in Table 3. First o®, we ¯nd
evidence of a time varying conditional variance in in°ation in nearly two thirds of countries
in the sample. Of the 11 countries for which we ¯nd evidence of time-varying conditional
heteroskedasticity, the ARCH e®ects are not persistent in 5 cases. In each of these cases, the
estimate of b is negative, and is statistically signi¯cant in 4 of the cases. In the remaining
6 countries, for which we ¯nd evidence on persistent ARCH e®ects, the estimates of b are
positive but not statistically signi¯cant in two countries, and negative in four countries,
though not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in two of the latter.
Table 4 estimates using the GDP data on a smaller sample of countries are similar to the
14For completeness, we also analyzed the e®ect of time-varying conditional variances using the level of
in°ation, by ¯tting a GARCH-M in in°ation as suggested by equation 3.14. We found evidence of conditional
heteroskedasticity in the CPI-based in°ation rate for 12 of the 18 countries in the sample (Australia, Austria,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, United Kingdom, and United
States). Of these 12 countries, all except for Austria had a positive and statistically signi¯cant estimated
coe±cient on the estimated conditional variance of the in°ation rate in the GARCH-M regression. All
12 of these countries displayed persistent conditional heteroskedasticity, with the sum of the estimated
GARCH(1,1) coe±cients exceeding 0.75. In 11 cases, the GARCH(1,1) coe±cients exceeded 0.960 and in
¯ve cases the constraint that the sum of the GARCH(1,1) coe±cients cannot exceed unity was binding.
16results reported in Table 3. The main di®erence is that the ARCH e®ects are persistent for
Australia, Japan, when the GDP de°ator is used, and the slope coe±cients become positive
and statistically insigni¯cant in these countries. Also, the U.S. exhibits (persistent) ARCH
e®ects when the de°ator is used, and the estimate for b is both negative and statistically
signi¯cant.
The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 o®er mixed support for the mechanism of asym-
metric preferences coupled with a time varying variance of in°ation. However, at least
judged by the metric of goodness of ¯t, our results do not translate into support for the
view that this mechanism is an important determinant of changes in in°ation. The R2 val-
ues for the regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4 are almost uniformly low. Of the 18 cases,
across the two tables, where we ¯nd evidence of time varying conditional heteroskedasticity,
the R2 is below 0.1 in 16 cases, lying below 0.04 in 14 cases. The exceptions are the U.K.
using the CPI as the measure of prices, and Italy, using the GDP de°ator, in which cases
the R2 values are 0.14 and 0.22 respectively. Even in this latter case, which provides the
best ¯t, the model is explaining only about 20% of the variance in in°ation changes.
Overall, we cannot reject the notion that support for a version of the model with asym-
metric preferences in in°ation is present in the time series data of at least some countries.
However, the evidence in favor of this view as an important determinant of in°ation is weak.
4 Evidence from a Cross Section of Countries
In this section we examine whether the model can explain in°ation outcomes in cross
sectional data. Essentially, we ignore the time series aspect of the problem by analyzing av-
erage in°ation outcomes across countries over a given time period (1981-2002). Eliminating
17the time dimension from equation 2.8 leads to our baseline speci¯cation:15
¹ ¼j = a + b1¹ uj + b2¾u;j + b3¾¼;j + ²j; (4.16)
where ¹ ¼j is the measure of in°ation in country j, ¹ uj is the measure of the NAIRU in country
j, and ¾u;j , and ¾¼;j are our estimates of the standard deviations of unemployment and
in°ation, respectively, in country j.
According to the model, the NAIRU is exogenous. Furthermore, due to the inability of
monetary policy to a®ect unemployment outcomes in rational expectations models of this
sort, the actual unemployment rate only ever di®ers from the NAIRU due to exogenous
shocks. Hence, assuming a constant NAIRU, it is consistent with the model to use the
sample average unemployment rate as a proxy for un in a linear regression. Thus, ¹ uj, our
measure of the NAIRU for country j, is the sample average of our annual unemployment
data.
There are a number of possible measures of the volatility of in°ation and unemployment.
Interpreted literally, the model implies that in°ation should be related, more or less linearly,
to the conditional variances of in°ation and unemployment, rather than their standard
deviations (see equation 2.8, for example). However, the data suggest a linear relationship
between in°ation and the standard deviations of in°ation and unemployment. Since the use
of standard deviations rather than variances does not change the main thrust of the results,
and since the exact form of the equilibrium (equation 2.7) depends on the speci¯c nature
of the loss function assumed in any case, we report the results using standard deviations,
rather than variances, as our measure of volatility in this section of the paper.
Our measure of the conditional standard deviations of unemployment and in°ation is
the sample average of the conditional standard deviations recovered from estimating a
15Throughout this section we present results based on the most general version of the model in which the
Kydland-Prescott Barro-Gordon in°ation bias is not ruled out and the central banker's objective function
is allowed to be asymmetric in both in°ation and unemployment. The results are robust to more restricted
versions of the model in which either one of the asymmetries or the in°ation bias (or both) is ruled out by
assumption. So, for example, omitting ¹ uj and ¾¼j does not change the substantive results of the estimation.
Versions of the empirical model that omit measures of the volatility of in°ation display little explanatory
power, at least as measured by R
2 values.
18GARCH(1,1) model on the underlying annual time series data. Since, in this section, we
are working o® cross country data and ignoring the time series dimension of the prob-
lem, the sample standard deviation and the mean conditional standard deviation converge
asymptotically. As a result, it is reasonable to use the sample standard deviations as an
alternate measure of the volatility of unemployment and in°ation to provide a check on the
robustness of our results to the measure of volatility employed.
The last unobservable is the in°ation target, ¼¤. We start with the simplest assumption,
that all countries target the same rate of in°ation. Note that the target rate of in°ation is
the rate of in°ation that would obtain if average unemployment, the conditional variance of
in°ation and the conditional variance of unemployment were equal to zero. In other words,
it is the intercept of equation 4.16.
The results of our cross sectional estimation are presented in Table 5. All of the results
reported in Table 5 are based on OLS and use the mean of the conditional standard devi-
ations of in°ation and unemployment as the measures of volatility. All of these results are
robust to the use of the sample standard deviations. We do not report results using the
sample standard deviations mainly due to their strong similarity to the results reported.
White's heteroskedasticity consistent robust standard errors are reported throughout Table
5.
Our sample also includes three outliers with regards to in°ation16 We have excluded
these outliers from the sample for all of the regressions summarized in Table 5. The results
presented are robust to the inclusion of the outlying countries, with one exception, which
we discuss below.
The ¯rst column of Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of equation (4.16).
The ¯rst thing to note is that the only statistically signi¯cant ¯nding is that the average
in°ation rate depends directly on the standard deviation of in°ation, which is positive
and statistically signi¯cant at the 1% level. None of the other coe±cients is statistically
16The outliers are Argentina, with an average annual in°ation rate of 368%, Brazil, with average annual
in°ation of 529%, and Nicaragua, with an annual average in°ation rate of 1248%. The next highest average
in°ation rate in the sample is 60% (Turkey).
19signi¯cant at conventional signi¯cance levels. The ¯t of the model is unusually tight, as
can be seen by the high R2 value. This close ¯t is due to the strong relationship between
average in°ation and the standard deviation of in°ation.
The second point of interest is that the estimate of the coe±cient for the standard
deviation of in°ation has the \wrong," or at least less intuitive, sign. Recall (see equation
2.8 and the surrounding discussion) that a positive value of b3 corresponds to a negative
value of ® (the parameter governing the asymmetry in in°ation in the central banker's
loss function). While the model does not place restrictions on the sign of ®, a positive
relationship between the volatility of in°ation and average in°ation corresponds to the
case where the central banker ¯nds in°ation outcomes below target more costly than high
in°ation outcomes. This is the intuitively unappealing case, and it seems unlikely that
such a mechanism could be responsible for such a strong relationship as the one detected in
the data here. The coe±cients on average unemployment and the mean of the conditional
standard deviation of unemployment do have the \correct" signs, but the estimates are not
statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
One concern with the results presented in the ¯rst column of Table 5 is the use of the raw
level of in°ation as the dependent variable where the model predicts that the conditional
variances of unemployment and in°ation a®ect the deviation of equilibrium in°ation from
target. The main concern, in a cross country regression, is that the central bank's target
in°ation rate might di®er across countries. In this case, running the simple regression
of in°ation against the conditional variance of unemployment will be misleading. This is
an important issue given that our data set contains some fairly heterogeneous countries
and that countries' in°ation targets are unobservable. We take three approaches to deal
with this problem: ¯rst, we re-estimate the model using a more homogenous sample of
countries, second, we try to control for di®erences in in°ation targets by including in the
regression proxy variables that are thought to a®ect average in°ation outcomes, and ¯nally,
we re-estimate the model in di®erences, which eliminates any cross country di®erences in
in°ation targets to the extent that these cross country di®erences are constant over time.
20The ¯rst approach consists simply of re-estimating equation (4.16) using a more ho-
mogenous sample of 21 OECD countries.17 The second column of Table 5 presents the
results. The results closely resemble the results reported in the ¯rst column of Table 5: the
coe±cient on the standard deviation of in°ation is both positive and statistically signi¯cant
at the 1% level, while the other coe±cients are not statistically signi¯cant at conventional
signi¯cance levels. Again, the close relationship between average in°ation and the standard
deviation of in°ation results in a tight ¯t, as evidenced by the high R2 values, though, as
before, the coe±cient on the mean conditional standard deviation of in°ation enters with
the wrong sign. As in the previous case, these results are robust to the inclusion of outliers
and the use of the sample standard deviations as the measures of volatility.
The second approach requires ¯nding proxy variables that might allow us to control
for cross country di®erences in in°ation targets. To this end, we looked at the empirical
literature on cross country in°ation di®erences to see what variables are thought to in°uence
average in°ation outcomes. Commonly used control variables are lagged average in°ation,
lagged real income, openness, central bank independence, and G/Y.18
We model these variables as forming the typical in°ation rate of a country around which
discretionary monetary policy then operates. We allow our control variables to in°uence
average in°ation linearly, resulting in the following estimating equation:
¹ ¼j = a + b1 ¢ ¹ uj + b2 ¢ ¾u;j + b3 ¢ ¾¼;j + c1 ¢ CBIj + c2 ¢ OPENj
+c3 ¢ G=Yj + c4 ¢ L(¹ ¼j) + c5 ¢ L(Yj) + ²j; (4.17)
where CBIj is the measure of central bank independence in country j, OPENj is the
measure of openness in country j, (G=Y )j is government expenditures relative to GDP in
country j, L(¹ ¼j) is lagged average in°ation in country j, and L(Yj) is lagged real per capita
17The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
18Campillo and Miron (1997) provide a synthesis of the literature on cross country in°ation di®erences,
incorporating a wide range of control variables common in the literature. Our control variables are taken
from their paper. Detailed information concerning the construction of the data set, along with a discussion
of each of these variables and why they are used in in°ation regressions is contained in the data appendix
to the paper.
21income in country j. According to this speci¯cation then our estimate of the in°ation target
is ^ ¼¤
j = c1 ¢ CBIj + c2 ¢ OPENj + c3 ¢ G=Yj + c4 ¢ L(¹ ¼j) + c5 ¢ L(Yj).
Column 3 of Table 5 presents the results. As in the previous cases, the coe±cient on the
volatility of in°ation is positive and statistically signi¯cant at the 1% level. The signs of the
other coe±cients have the intuitively attractive signs, but the estimates are not statistically
signi¯cant from zero. Again, the R2 is high.
These results are by and large robust to the use of the sample standard deviations, and
the inclusion of outlier observations. The one exception is the case where the outliers are
included and the conditional standard deviation is used as the measure of volatility. In
this case the coe±cients on average unemployment and the conditional standard deviation
of unemployment are statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level. Experiments with various
permutations on the set of included control variables did not change the results in any
substantive way.
Our ¯nal approach to the problem of unobserved ¼¤
j is to estimate the model in di®er-
ences so as to eliminate any cross country di®erences in in°ation targets. The estimating
equation is:
¢¹ ¼j = a + b1¢¾u;j + b2¢¾¼;j + ¢b3¹ uj + ²j; (4.18)
where ¢Xj = Xj;t ¡ Xj;t¡1. We estimate the model using approximately decade long
samples, so that t is the sample period 1990-2002, and t¡1 is the period 1980-1989. Then,
¢¹ ¼j, for example, is the di®erence between average in°ation from 1980-1989 to 1990-2002.
We include an intercept term to capture any common time trend in in°ation targets across
countries.
Column 4 of Table 5 presents the results. Again,the results closely resemble the previ-
ously reported results: the coe±cient on the volatility of in°ation is positive and statistically
signi¯cant at the 1% level. In this case, the sign of the coe±cient on the volatility of unem-
ployment is positive, though the coe±cient is not statistically signi¯cant and the sign of the
coe±cient on average unemployment is negative, though, again it is not statistically signif-
22icant. The R2 values are again high. The positive sign on the coe±cient of the volatility of
unemployment is not a robust result, and only occurs in the case when outliers are excluded
and the means of the conditional standard deviations of unemployment and in°ation are
used as the measures of volatility. In all other permutations, the sign of this coe±cient is
negative, though statistically insigni¯cant.
The results reported in Column 4 of Table 5 are not robust to the inclusion of the
three high in°ation countries to the estimation.19 When these countries are included in
the sample, the coe±cient on the standard deviation of in°ation remains positive,but the
estimate is no longer statistically signi¯cant.
The results presented in columns 2 through 4 of Table 5 represent attempts to control
for country speci¯c di®erences in the intercept term in our baseline regression model. A
related issue that arises because of the pooled nature of the data is the possibility that some
slope parameters may di®er across countries.
In particular, there is a literature that argues that the slope of the short run Phillips
curve, ¸ and the Barro-Gordon in°ationary bias, k, are endogenous. The degree of central
bank independence is thought to a®ect the in°ationary bias parameter, and openness is
thought to a®ect the slope of the short run Phillips curve (Romer (1993)). We incorporate
these e®ects by interacting our measures of central bank independence and openness with
the relevant regressor: average unemployment. Allowing for cross country slope parameters
to vary in this way results in:
¹ ¼j = a + b1 ¢ ¹ uj + b2 ¢ ¾u;j + b3 ¢ ¾¼;j + c1 ¢ CBIj + c2 ¢ OPENj + c3 ¢ G=Yj
+c4 ¢ L(¹ ¼j) + c5 ¢ L(Yj) + d1 ¢ CBIj ¢ ¹ uj + d2 ¢ OPENj ¢ ¹ uj + ²j (4.19)
Column 5 of Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of equation 4.19 The results
closely resemble the previously reported results: the coe±cient on the volatility of in°ation
is positive and statistically signi¯cant at the 1% level. The sign of the coe±cient on the
19These three countries, Argentina, Brazil, and Nicaragua, are also outliers in terms of the change in
average in°ation, which is equal to 664%, 808%, and 107% respectively. The majority of the countries in
the sample experienced a decline in average in°ation between these two periods, and the next highest value
in the sample is 32% (Venezuela).
23volatility of unemployment is negative in each cases, but not statistically signi¯cant, and
the sign of the coe±cient on average in°ation is positive, but not statistically signi¯cant.
The R2 values are again high. The results are largely robust to the use of the sample
standard deviations, and the inclusion of outlier observations, though in this last case the
coe±cients on average unemployment and the mean of the conditional standard deviation
of unemployment are statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level.
A ¯nal issue is that if in°ation is skewed then measurement error in in°ation is correlated
with the conditional variances. The OLS estimates of the slope then re°ect correlation
between in°ation and the conditional variances, but also correlation between measurement
error and the conditional variances (which is proportional to the skewness of the independent
variable). Ruge-Murcia (2002) deals with this by using one sample period to estimate the
conditional variances and a di®erent sample period to derive average in°ation.
Table 6 presents the result of a re-estimation of our base model (equation 4.16) on decade
by decade data, using the lagged, rather than contemporaneous, value of ¾¼ as the measure
of in°ation for the sample of 44 countries. In other words, we estimate the base model
(equation 4.16) using data based on one sample period (for example 1990-2002), but base
our measure of ¾¼ on the previous period (that is, 1980-1989). Column 1 reports the results
using the 1990-2002 as the base period, and column 2 reports the results where 1980-1989
is the base period (in which case ¾¼ is based on 1970-1979 data). In both cases, the mean
of the conditional standard deviation is the measure of volatility. Under this speci¯cation,
none of the estimated coe±cients (aside from the constant term in the 1980s regressions)
are statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, and the model ¯ts the data quite poorly.
Table 6 also reports results from the same analysis applied to a sample of 21 OECD
countries. Column 3 reports the results for the 1990s, while column 4 reports the results
from the 1980s. For this more homogenous group of countries, the use of lagged, instead
of contemporaneous, ¾¼ does not change the results so drastically. In this case, the coe±-
cient on the (lagged) standard deviation of in°ation is positive in both cases, statistically
signi¯cant at the 1% level in both the 1990s and 1980s regression. The coe±cient on the
24conditional standard deviation is negative and statistically insigni¯cant for both decades,
and the coe±cient on average unemployment is positive in both cases but not statistically
signi¯cant in either case. The ¯t of these equations, as measured by the R2's is not as tight
as in the cases where the contemporaneous standard deviation of in°ation was used, but
still quite high for cross sectional estimation.
Ruge-Murcia (2002), and Cukierman & Gerlach (2003) have previously tested versions
of the asymmetric preference model on cross sectional data for samples of OECD countries.
Ruge-Murcia (2002) ¯nds evidence that the volatility of unemployment, but not the volatil-
ity of in°ation, contributes to average in°ation using quarterly data for a sample of OECD
countries in the 1990s. Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) study the case where preferences
are asymmetric only in unemployment, and there is no KPBG bias, using sample standard
deviations as their measure of the volatility of unemployment. They ¯nd some evidence
that the volatility of unemployment contributes to average in°ation prior to 1985, but not
afterwards, a result which they argue is likely due to increased central bank independence
in the latter period. Their results are consistent with our ¯ndings, that the volatility of
unemployment does not contribute to in°ation post 1980.
5 Conclusion
Overall, the results presented in this paper provide, at best, weak support for the view that
the interaction of asymmetric central bank preferences and the volatilities of in°ation and
unemployment are important determinants of in°ation. In particular, neither the time series
nor cross sectional data supports the view that the volatility of unemployment helps explains
in°ation. Estimated coe±cients on variables measuring this volatility are consistently not
statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, and frequently posses the wrong sign.
The results concerning the relevance of asymmetric preferences in in°ation are more
di±cult to interpret. The time series results provide support for the view that the interaction
between a changing volatility of in°ation and a central bank endowed with an asymmetric
loss function a®ects in°ation in some OECD countries. However, this mechanism appears
25to explain only a small portion of the variance of changes in in°ation in these countries.
Furthermore, while incorporating measures of the volatility of in°ation seems to help
explain cross country di®erences in average in°ation, it is not at all clear, however, whether
this correlation is due to asymmetric central bank preferences. While the model does not
place restrictions on the sign this correlation, our results corresponds to the case where
the central banker ¯nds in°ation outcomes below target more costly than high in°ation
outcomes. This seems to be an unlikely description of central banker's preferences.
26Data Appendix
Quarterly Data for Section 3
We collected data on quarterly unemployment and CPI-based in°ation rates for eighteen
countries, listed below. The data are taken from the OECD's Main Economic Indicators
database. Series numbers for both the unemployment and CPI data are listed in the table
below:
Country Sample Series # u Series # CPI
Australia (1966:3-2003:3) 544113DSA 545241K
Austria (1964:1-2003:3) 704115DSA 705241K
Belgium (1979:3-2003:3) 224111DSA 225241K
Canada (1964:1-2003:3) 444113DSA 445241K
Denmark (1970:1-2003:3) 304111DSA 305241K
Finland (1964:1-2003:3) 644113DSA 645241K
France (1967:4-2003:3) 114113DSA 145241K
Germany (1964:1-2002:4) 134111DSA 125241K
Ireland (1983:1-2003:3) 284113DSA 285241K
Italy (1964:1-2003:3) 164113DSA 165241K
Japan (1964:1-2003:3) 464113DSA 465241K
Netherlands (1988:2-2003:3) 184111D 185241K
New Zealand (1985:4-2003:2) 594113DSA 595241K
Norway (1972:1-2003:3) 584113DSA 585241K
Sweden (1970:1-2003:3) 604113DSA 605241K
Switzerland (1983:1-2003:3) 684111DSA 685241K
United Kingdom (1964:1-2003:3) 264111DSA 265241K
United States (1964:1-2003:3) 424113DSA 425241K
Annual Data for Section 4
We collected annual data from 1981-2002 on unemployment and CPI-based in°ation
for 47 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mex-
ico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Portu-
gal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United
27Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
The CPI data were taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics Database.
The unemployment data were taken from the same IMF database, and are supplemented
with additional information taken from the ILO Labor Statistics Database.
We augmented this data with a number of other variables, including lagged average
in°ation, real income, openness, central bank independence, and G/Y used in the estimation
of equations (4.17) and (4.19) to control for potential di®erences in in°ation targets across
countries. What follows is a description of the construction of these variables, along with a
brief explanation of why these variables are thought to matter for in°ation outcomes.
Lagged average in°ation is measured using average CPI-based in°ation for the years
1970-1980. The underlying CPI data is again taken from the IMF International Financial
Statistics database. This is included to capture a number of possibilities: it may capture
unmeasured country speci¯c factors that a®ect in°ation outcomes, so that high past in°ation
may suggest high future in°ation; countries that have experienced high in°ation in the
past may ¯nd, after experiencing the costs of in°ation, that reform is needed, making high
in°ation in the future less likely; or countries that have experienced high in°ation historically
may have invested in technologies or institutions to reduce the costs of in°ation, making
high in°ation in the future less objectionable.
Real income is measured using the log of per capital real GDP in 1980, using the
RGDPCH series from the Penn World Tables. This is included in case there are any rich
country speci¯c e®ects on in°ation. For example, rich countries may have better developed
tax and ¯nancial systems, which would reduce reliance on an in°ation tax. Alternately,
rich countries may be more readily able to a®ord technologies which reduce the costs of
in°ation.
Openness is measured as the average of the ratio of Exports plus Imports to GDP
from 1981-2002. It has been argued (by Romer (1993), for example) that openness a®ects
in°ation by making it easier for the central bank to commit to low in°ation. The idea is
that in°ationary policy leads to real exchange rate depreciations, which are more costly in
28countries that trade more.
There are a couple of viable measures of Central Bank Independence available in the
literature. We use two. The ¯rst is due to Cukierman and Webb (1995), which bases a
measure of Central Bank Independence on the probability that a central banker will be
replaced shortly after a change in government, and covers the period for 1980-1989. This
data covers most, but not all of, the countries in our sample. We supplement it with data
from Sturm and de Haan (2001) which extend this measure to a large set of developing
countries, for the period 1980-1998. A more independent central bank is thought to have a
greater ability to commit to in°ation than one that is more subject to political control.
Government expenditures to GDP (G/Y) is measured as the average of government ex-
penditures to GDP, with the data taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics
database. This is included to capture the idea that governments experiencing di±culty
¯nancing their expenditures may in°ate their currencies to enjoy seignorage revenues. Al-
ternative, and probably better, measures include the ratio of the government budget de¯cit
or debt to GDP, but this data was not readily available for many of the countries in our
sample.
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32Table 1. Testing the Signi¯cance of the Slope Coe±cient in a Spurious Regression:
Actual Rejection Rates for a Test with Nominal Size Equal to 0.05
T=100
(®;!) ½ = 0:00 ½ = 0:40 ½ = 0:80 ½ = 0:90 ½ = 0:95 ½ = 0:99 ½ = 1:00
(0.1,0.1) 0.054 0.083 0.103 0.091 0.091 0.110 0.113
(0.1,0.4) 0.044 0.118 0.203 0.233 0.243 0.239 0.241
(0.1,0.8) 0.043 0.168 0.416 0.495 0.568 0.611 0.595
(0.1,0.9) 0.049 0.207 0.474 0.596 0.698 0.733 0.755
(0.01,0.99) 0.052 0.202 0.495 0.631 0.665 0.765 0.749
(0.4,0.1) 0.065 0.092 0.162 0.184 0.196 0.181 0.194
(0.8,0.1) 0.042 0.108 0.198 0.253 0.276 0.285 0.276
(0.9,0.1) 0.043 0.106 0.232 0.266 0.303 0.300 0.312
(0.95,0.05) 0.043 0.102 0.230 0.252 0.240 0.270 0.305
(1.0,0.0) 0.070 0.105 0.181 0.225 0.239 0.260 0.275
T=2000
(®;!) ½ = 0:00 ½ = 0:40 ½ = 0:80 ½ = 0:90 ½ = 0:95 ½ = 0:99 ½ = 1:00
(0.1,0.1) 0.044 0.079 0.090 0.108 0.087 0.106 0.114
(0.1,0.4) 0.067 0.140 0.205 0.233 0.236 0.279 0.265
(0.1,0.8) 0.057 0.186 0.405 0.530 0.598 0.627 0.667
(0.1,0.9) 0.040 0.180 0.518 0.624 0.727 0.837 0.877
(0.01,0.99) 0.056 0.201 0.497 0.641 0.766 0.883 0.941
(0.4,0.1) 0.046 0.114 0.173 0.190 0.213 0.238 0.244
(0.8,0.1) 0.052 0.136 0.247 0.276 0.340 0.352 0.357
(0.9,0.1) 0.035 0.129 0.242 0.291 0.341 0.331 0.388
(0.95,0.05) 0.040 0.114 0.227 0.298 0.334 0.336 0.357
(1.0,0.0) 0.051 0.117 0.233 0.282 0.279 0.304 0.332
Notes: This table contains the rejection rates for two-sided t-tests of the null hypothesis
that the slope coe±cient in the regression of an AR(1) process on an independently
generated GARCH(1,1) process is equal to zero, using a nominal test size of 5-percent (i.e.
using a critical value equal to 1.96). The results are derived from Monte Carlo simulations
using 1000 simulations for each parameter combination. T refers to the sample size. The
AR(1) process has the form yt = ½yt¡1 + ut, ut » i:i:d:N(0;1). The GARCH(1,1) process
has the form wt = vt
p
ht, ht = 1 + ®w2
t¡1 + !ht¡1 where vt » i:i:dN(0;1). Initial values
were set equal to zero and 500-period burn-in periods were used.
33Table 2. Change in In°ation on the Change in the Conditional Variance of Unemployment
Country Sample Period LM-test p-values ^ b t(b) ® + !
Australia 1966:3-2003:3 0.20 - - -
Austria 1964:1-2003:3 0.10 0.27 1.83* 0.124
Belgium 1979:1-2003:3 0.05 0.00 0.77 0.800
Canada 1964:1-2003:3 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.671
Denmark 1970:1-2003:3 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.996
Finland 1964:1-2003:3 0.26 - - -
France 1967:1-2003:3 0.42 - - -
Germany 1964:1-2002:4 0.06 -0.04 -0.94 0.715
Ireland 1983:1-2003:3 0.05 -0.07 -0.55 0.910
Italy 1964:1-2003:3 0.11 - - -
Japan 1964:1-2003:3 0.30 - - -
Netherlands 1988:2-2003:3 0.42 - - -
New Zealand 1985:4-2003:2 0.13 - - -
Norway 1972:1-2003:3 0.56 - - -
Sweden 1970:1-2003:3 0.00 -0.10 -1.98** 0.903
Switzerland 1983:1-2003:3 0.43 - - -
UK 1964:1-2003:3 0.00 0.03 0.44 0.301
US 1964:1-2003:3 0.00 -0.02 -2.01** 0.897
Notes:
² The LM test column provides p-values for the Engle (1982) LM test for neglected
ARCH e®ects. The LM test is based on the distribution of the T ¢ R2 statistic from
the regression of the squared residuals from an AR(p) model of the ¯rst-di®erence of
the unemployment rate on a constant and one, two, three, and four lags of the
squared residuals. The value of p, for the AR(p), was selected by applying the AIC.
The table reports only the lowest of the p-values from the LM tests, as we included
in the sample countries displaying any evidence of possible conditional
heteroskedasticity.
² The t(b) column provides the t-ratio for the slope coe±cient in the regression of the
¯rst-di®erence of the in°ation rate on the ¯rst-di®erence of the conditional variance
of the unemployment rate.
² The ® + ! column provides the sum of the estimates slope coe±cients in the
GARCH(1,1) model of the errors from the AR(p) model of the ¯rst-di®erence of the
unemployment rate.
* = reject at the 10% level, ** = reject at the 5% level, *** = reject at the 1% level
34Table 3. Change in In°ation on the Change in the Conditional Variance of In°ation (CPI)
Country Sample Period LM-test p-values ^ b t(b) ® + !
Australia 1966:3-2003:3 0.01 -0.15 -2.09** 0.349
Austria 1964:1-2003:3 0.00 -0.31 -2.87*** 1.000
Belgium 1979:1-2003:3 0.10 -0.28 -0.90 0.304
Canada 1964:1-2003:3 0.01 -0.35 -1.35 0.730
Denmark 1970:1-2003:3 0.04 0.10 0.50 0.929
Finland 1964:1-2003:3 0.01 -0.32 -0.50 0.817
France 1967:1-2003:3 0.18 - - -
Germany 1964:1-2002:4 0.05 -87.97 -2.03** 0.396
Ireland 1983:1-2003:3 0.21 - - -
Italy 1964:1-2003:3 0.00 0.16 0.91 1.000
Japan 1964:1-2003:3 0.01 -0.25 -3.37*** 0.372
Netherlands 1988:2-2003:3 0.22 - - -
New Zealand 1985:4-2003:2 0.55 - - -
Norway 1972:1-2003:3 0.00 -0.05 -0.34 1.000
Sweden 1970:1-2003:3 0.71 - - -
Switzerland 1983:1-2003:3 0.82 - - -
UK 1964:1-2003:3 0.00 -0.52 -4.94*** 0.363
US 1964:1-2003:3 0.14 - - -
Notes:
² The LM test column provides p-values for the Engle (1982) LM test for neglected
ARCH e®ects. The LM test is based on the distribution of the T ¤ R2 statistic from
the regression of the squared residuals from an AR(p) model of the ¯rst-di®erence of
the in°ation rate on a constant and one, two, three, and four lags of the squared
residuals. The value of p, for the AR(p), was selected by applying the AIC. The
table reports only the lowest of the p-values from the LM tests, as we included in the
sample countries displaying any evidence of possible conditional heteroskedasticity.
² The t(b) column provides the t-ratio for the slope coe±cient in the regression of the
¯rst-di®erence of the in°ation rate on the ¯rst-di®erence of the conditional variance
of the in°ation rate.
² The ® + ! column provides the sum of the estimated ARCH and GARCH
coe±cients in the GARCH-M model of the in°ation rate on the conditional variance
of the in°ation rate. The model was ¯t by QMLE using a GARCH(1,1) speci¯cation.
* = reject at the 10% level, ** = reject at the 5% level, *** = reject at the 1% level
35Table 4. Change in In°ation on the Change in the Conditional Variance of In°ation (GDP
De°ator)
Country Sample Period LM-test p-values ^ b t(b) ® + !
Australia 1966:3-2003:3 0.00 0.03 1.96* 1.000
Canada 1964:1-2003:3 0.03 0.10 0.70 0.990
France 1970:2-1998:4 0.03 -0.03 -0.35 1.000
Germany 1964:1-2002:4 0.00 -0.25 -3.92*** 0.961
Italy 1964:1-2003:3 0.00 6.36 6.61*** 0.002
Japan 1964:1-1999:4 0.01 0.04 0.94 0.962
Switzerland 1983:1-2003:3 0.24 - - -
UK 1964:1-1998:4 0.01 -0.02 -1.23 0.837
US 1964:1-2003:3 0.02 -0.52 -1.95* 0.953
Notes:
² The LM test column provides p-values for the Engle (1982) LM test for neglected
ARCH e®ects. The LM test is based on the distribution of the T ¤ R2 statistic from
the regression of the squared residuals from an AR(p) model of the ¯rst-di®erence of
the in°ation rate on a constant and one, two, three, and four lags of the squared
residuals. The value of p, for the AR(p), was selected by applying the AIC. The
table reports only the lowest of the p-values from the LM tests, as we included in the
sample countries displaying any evidence of possible conditional heteroskedasticity.
² The t(b) column provides the t-ratio for the slope coe±cient in the regression of the
¯rst-di®erence of the in°ation rate on the ¯rst-di®erence of the conditional variance
of the in°ation rate.
² The ® + ! column provides the sum of the estimated ARCH and GARCH
coe±cients in the GARCH-M model of the in°ation rate on the conditional variance
of the in°ation rate. The model was ¯t by QMLE using a GARCH(1,1) speci¯cation.
* = reject at the 10% level, ** = reject at the 5% level, *** = reject at the 1% level
36Table 5. Cross Sectional Estimation
Base OECD ¼¤ Proxies Di®erenced Slope Interactions
Constant 1.06 -0.07 7.14 -1.59 7.66
(std. error) (0.95) (0.26) (5.56) (1.47) (5.60)
p-value 0.27 0.78 0.21 0.61 0.18
¾u -1.17 -0.11 -0.25 0.03 -0.28
(std. error) (1.07) (0.20) (1.35) (0.02) (1.23)
p-value 0.28 0.58 0.85 0.13 0.82
¾¼ 0.62*** 0.75*** 0.62*** 0.81*** 0.61***
(std. error) (0.11) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07)
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
u 1.32 0.14 0.43 -0.67 0.58
(std. error) (1.11) (0.19) (1.38) (0.40) (1.26)
p-value 0.24 0.47 0.76 0.10 0.65
CBI - - 0.07 - -5.21
(std. error) (3.53) (5.16)
Open - - -2.13** - -0.26
(std. error) (0.84) (1.27)
G/Y - - -60.34** - -56.04**
(std. error) (25.38) (24.94)
L(¼) - - 0.00 - -0.02
(std. error) (0.02) (0.02)
L(Y ) - - 0.57 - 0.38
(std. error) (0.71) (0.75)
CBI¢u - - - - 0.77
(std. error) (0.69)
Open¢u - - - - -0.33
(std. error) (0.21)
R2 0.90 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.94
* = signi¯cant at the 10% level, ** = signi¯cant at the 5% level,
*** = signi¯cant at the 1% level
37Table 6. Cross Sectional Estimation: Lagged ¾¼
Full Sample OECD Countries
1990s 1980s 1990s 1980s
Constant -0.27 10.92* 1.44** -2.87**
(std. error) (4.35) (6.16) (0.52) (1.34)
p-value 0.95 0.08 0.01 0.05
¾u -0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.03**
(std. error) (0.05) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01)
p-value 0.74 0.34 0.11 0.03
L(¾¼) 0.16 0.16 0.18*** 0.96***
(std. error) (0.12) (0.14) (0.04) (0.16)
p-value 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.00
u 0.88 0.92 -0.12 0.39
(std. error) (1.23) (1.24) (0.08) (0.25)
p-value 0.43 0.46 0.17 0.14
R2 0.17 0.08 0.66 0.71
* = signi¯cant at the 10% level, ** = signi¯cant at the 5% level,
*** = signi¯cant at the 1% level
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